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Abstract 
Expediency of use of the instrumental apparatus of modeling is shown in article at justification of efficiency of creation of the 
integrated structures. Models of the horizontal integration considering number of the enterprises in the regional market, the 
volume of branch release, limit and constant production expenses, synergy, effects of decrease in expenses as a result of 
integration are offered. Conditions under which integration, from the point of view of the uniting enterprises, is expedient are 
defined. 
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Introduction 
At the present stage of the Russian economy development the top priority goals are increasing of economic growth, 
import substitution, increase efficiency and strengthen of competitiveness. The leading role in those problems 
solving belongs to large integrated companies (Johnson, 2014), in relation to the agrarian sector of the economy. in 
all obvious importance of small and medium entrepreneurship the large structures that have their own financial 
resources   (Nica, 2014), as well as significant opportunities to attract them, can provide structural and technological 
modernization of the agroindustrial complex. 
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Integration transfer the interaction between organizations to a new quality level (Nica and Potcovaru, 2014), give 
them opportunities for the effective management of industrial, financial, logistical processes (Baye, 2009), 
development of investment and innovation, create the background of agribusiness companies competitiveness in the 
domestic and foreign markets (McConnell, Brue and Flynn, 2011). 
Intensification of integration processes is one of the characteristic features of the modern world economy 
(Erokhin and Ivolga, 2011). On the agrifood market is dominated the large enterprises of national and transnational 
scale, characterized by a high scale of concentration and vertical integration (Gumerov, 2002). 
The topic connected with integration development is now become more relevant because of the necessity to 
research its impact on social and labor relations in the agrarian sector of the economy, the growth of globalization 
and Russia's WTO accession. 
Insufficient scientific substantiation of theoretical and methodological issues of the establishment and operation 
of integrated formations (Misra and Mohapatra, 2014)in relation to the modern conditions of agrarian economy, not 
the full use of the integration great potential, its strategic importance for the agriculture development, determine the 
deep study associated with their development. 
Theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of the integration processes are well represented in the 
foreign and domestic literature. General approaches to microeconomics and macroeconomic for the purposes of our 
research were obtained from the works of Samuelson and Nordhaus (2008), Pindyck and Rabinfeld (2002) 
Taranukha and Zemlyakov (2013), Parkin (2011) and Selishchev (2002). The economic nature of integration was 
investigated in the works ofNeprintseva and Shubin(2003), Vinslav (2001), and Efimenko (2004). Applications of 
integration processes in the sphere of agricultural production were analyzed by Klyukach(2004), Kirilenko(2002), 
Gumar (2004), and Gumerov (2002). 
Research of numerous authors show that the integration processes, actively carried out in the agricultural sector 
of Russia's economy in recent years, enhance the economic position of the agricultural organizations and the 
industry in general, have an impact on the market structure of agricultural raw materials and food. The emergence of 
major economic agents is the need to examine the specific characteristics of their behavior (Bensman, 2014), taking 
into account strategic interactions with other market participants (Mccahery and Vermeulen, 2014). 
Main text  
Modeling of the development of integration processes in the agricultural sector of the economy is based on the 
following provisions. 
Agriculture is seen as the industry in which may appear two types of competition (Arnold, 2011): 
1. milder form – Cournot’s competition – competition in sales, which develops as a result of the equilibrium price 
in excess of marginal costs, although less than the monopoly level; 
2. more rigid form – Bertrand competition – price competition as a result of which the prices are lowered to the 
level of the marginal cost of manufacture. 
In industry function n quantity of companies; Q — total production volume; P — final products price; P P Q -inversefunction of industrial demand for final product and  ' 0P Q  and ( ) 0P Qcc d forall Q
(Bade and Parkin, 2012). 
If marginal cost is C൒0and fixed costs is F൒0 Economic costs are the sum of the accounting costs and 
opportunity costs, the latter equal to the magnitude of the normal profits for the industry. Each firm maximizes 
economic profit (Galperin, IgnatievandMorgunov, 2008). 
 
     q P Q q C q FS  u            (1) 
 
According to the logic of the Cournot’s model, the industry is able to balance all firms earn the same positive 
accounting profit rate, which is normal for the industry (McConnell, BrueandBarbiero, 2002). Therefore, the 
economic profit of the firm (1), which is the difference between the accounting and the normal profit, is zero. Sign 
equilibrium state of the industry is to perform the following system of equations: 
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Here, the first equation expresses a necessary condition to maximize economic profit, defined by (1) where 
dQv
dq
 conjectural variation of aggregate output. When searching for the equilibrium position the industry it 
represents the total reaction Release Q change in output of an individual firm q. This variable takes values 
depending on the type of market and the behavior of firms. 
The second equation – it is the same for all firms condition null economic profit.  
Ability to obtain a synergistic effect is taken into account the assumption that if there is integration, the marginal 
cost of integrated enterprises becomes equal cO , where 1O d . 
1. Proceeding from the accepted conditions, consider the economic and mathematical reasons for the decision of 
horizontal integration if there are sunk costs of entry – the company incurs expenses related to the integration 
(acquisition of shares, payment of accounts payable merging insolvent company, etc.). This means that 0!S . 
Demand function for the industry's products consider linear   1P Q Q  . Profit and comprehensive output in 
equilibrium in the absence of integration are defined as follows 
 
21
1
c F S
N
S § ·   ¨ ¸© ¹           (3) 
 
 1
1
N c
Q
N
             (4) 
 
In the absence of integration firm may be included in the market so far, the profit S  is not yet become zero. 
Consequently, in the absence of integration the number of active enterprises in equilibrium is determined by the 
ratio. 
 
1 1cN
F S
             (5) 
 
If M enterprises decide to join, then arrived at the Cournot’s model for the integrated firm and a typical 
autonomous enterprises are defined by equations (6) and (7) respectively 
 
   2
1
1 1
2
N M c c
F MS
N M
O OS    § ·  ¨ ¸ © ¹       (6) 
  
  21 2
2O
c c
F S
N M
O OS   § ·  ¨ ¸ © ¹        (7) 
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The volume of output in the Cournot’s model for the integrated company: 
 
   1 1
2I
N M c N M c
q
N M
O              (8) 
 
For autonomous enterprises:  
 
 1 2
2O
c
q
N M
O              (9) 
 
From equation (9) it follows that in order to stand-alone company remained active after integration, the inequality
2 1/ cO !   Subject to this inequality equation (7) shows that OS  increases withO . 
Let us first investigate how the integration affects industry profits if N (number of enterprises in the industry) is 
set and held constant at a certain level of initial exogenously. In this case the union is advantageous for integrated 
companies provided I MS S t ; beneficial for autonomous entities subject OS S t , more beneficial for 
autonomous entities than for integrated enterprises provided O IMS St . For a given value N is defined  I M NO as the valueO  such that I MS S  , defined  O M NO as a value O ,  such as that OS S t and 
define  M NO as the valueO such that to simplify the calculations we will assumed that F O . 
Then equations (6) and (7) we obtain 
 
          
1 1 2 1
1 1I
N N M c M N M c
M N
N N M c
O       ª º¬ ¼        (10) 
 
  ( ) 1
( 1)O
N M c M
M N
N c
O     ,          (11) 
 
  1 ( 2 )ˆ
( 1 )
M N M M c
M N
N M M c
O                (12) 
For all values N and M inequality 
 I M NO !  ˆ M NO !  O M NO . 
The reason for this is the following ranking. When a horizontal integration (for N fixed), integrated enterprise 
internalize negative externalities, provided them with each other during competition in output. In the absence of 
synergies to reduce costs (i.e. for 1O  ), this causes the internalization of each integrated enterprise to reduce 
output, while each independent company responds by increased production [4].As a result, the union is detrimental 
integrated enterprises (unless M  too close to N ) an autonomous and profitable (if M close enough to N  the 
integration is beneficial for participants association, and  I M NO  not defined) .  
When 1O  the union is also generates synergies to reduce costs for participants’ integration. This decreases their 
costs forcing each participant’s integration to increase output, while autonomous companies are cutting production. 
As a result, profit integrated campaign increases and reduced profit autonomous organizations. When 
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I M NO O  is a positive impact on profits generated by reducing costs, balancing the negative effect of income 
arising due to internalization of externalities (described above), so that participants receive the same income 
integration in the presence and absence of integration. This means  I M NO O  that integration with participants 
must produce a lower total output than they would produce without integration. As a result, autonomous 
organizations must produce more output than in the absence of integration. Therefore, if  I M NO O  each 
autonomous organization produces more output and get more profits than in the absence of integration. This means 
that O IM MS S S!  when  I M NO O , and therefore  ˆ M NO  (and which corresponds to equality OMS  
and IS ) should be lower than  I M NO . Since IS  decreasing byO , and OS increases by O  , OMS  should exceed 
MS  at  ˆ M NO . That means, that  O M NO  corresponds to equality OS and S  , must be lower than ˆ M NO . 
2.Analyze the effects of integration in the presence of free entry into the industry. This determination requires an 
assessment of the critical values O for N N   (number of businesses that would get in the absence of market 
integration). 
We assume that the synergistic effects of reducing the costs associated with the integration are weak, if  ˆ M NO O t are moderate at    ˆ,O M N M NO O O  ª º¬ ¼ ; are strong at  O M NO O d . 
Assume that with the free entry of enterprises in market integration M enterprises optimally will not take place if 
the synergistic effects of reducing the costs associated with the integration are weak and  1 1S c MO Ot {   . 
If synergistic effects to reduce costs associated with the integration, are moderate when O Od  integration occurs, 
and it forces more businesses (compared with the situation lack of integration) to enter the market. If synergistic 
effects to reduce costs associated with the integration are strong integration occurs, and it forces fewer companies 
(compared to the situation lack of integration) to enter the market.  
It should be noted that since ˆ( ) 1MO  for all M that association is not accompanied give synergistic effects are 
not advantageous. Thus it is not necessarily about reducing costs, synergistic effects are considered here in the broad 
sense (such as 2 +2 = 5).  
These results allow us to assess the feasibility (profitability) integration from the perspective of the combining 
entities: optimal integration will not take place if the synergistic effects of integration satisfy 
   1 1S c MO Ot {  
                                                                                  (13)
 
and 
 
( 1)(1 )
1
1 ( 1)
S M c
c c M M
O  t     .                                                                                    (13.a) 
 
If the synergistic effects of integration satisfy 
 
( ) 1
( 1)
N M c M
N c
O   t  and
1 ( 2 )
( 1 )
M N M M c
N M M c
O    d                                                     (14)
 
or 
   1 1S c MO Od {   ,                                             (14a) 
integration is in order from the point of view of the combining entities. 
This position is a common result does not depend on assumptions about the linearity of the demand function. 
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3. Now consider the situation when the agricultural organizations do not compete in the volumes of output and 
prices, i.e. performed background Bertrand’s competition. 
When there is competition in price and analogues  ˆ M NO   and  O M NO  , and their rankings stored. We 
assume that the demand for the product i  is given by 1 ( )i i iq p p pJ    ,where p denotes the industry 
average price, and 0J t  - parameter, which is a measure of product differentiation ( J of  is a case where the 
goods are perfect substitutes, and 0J   - where the goods are not interconnected). 
Let us to introduce the following notation 
1
j
j
c c
N
{ ¦ , z NJ{ and 1 zV J{   .                                                   (14.b) 
Then, if the integration does not occur, the equilibrium price
1
1i
c
p
V
V
  , 
                                  
21
1
c
SS V V
  
§ ·¨ ¸© ¹ .                                           (14c)
       
Consider the situation when two organizations. Then the first order conditions for them are defined by 
 
1 1 21 (1 ) 2 (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0c p p z p c z p cO J J J O O          ,      
2 1 21 (1 ) 2 (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0c p p z p c z p cO J J J O O          ,           (15) 
 
and first-order condition for each non-integrated enterprise has the form 
 
1 (1 ) 2 (1 ) ( ) 0j jc p p z p cJ J J        .         (16) 
 
Summing up these equalities for all firms, and dividing the resulting equation to N , obtain 
 
1 21 (1 ) ( 2 ) 0
z
c p p p c
N
V V O       .          (17) 
 
1 21 ( ) ( ) 0c z p p pO V J V      .           (18) 
 
2
2
(1 )
(1 )
z z
c c
N Np
z
V V O J
V V
   
               (19) 
2 2
1 2 2
(1 ) [(1 )( ) 2 ]
(1 )
c c z z
p p
z
J V V O V V
V V
          .       2 2 2
2
(1 ) [ (1 ) ] (1 )
(1 )[ (1 ) ]j
c z c c z
p
z
V J V JV V V V O J
J V V V
             . 
 
1 1 1 2 2( ) ( )q p c z p cV    , 
2 2 2 1 1( ) ( )q p c z p cV    . 
2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2[( ) ( ) ] 2 ( )( ) 2p c p c z p c p c SS S V O O O O         . 
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2
1 2 12 ( ) 2 ( )( )I z p c SS S S V O      . 
2
2
1 (1 )( )
2 ( )
2[ (1 ) ]I
c c z
z S
z
J V JV O V VS V V V
        
§ ·¨ ¸© ¹ .    
 ( )i iq p cV  is 2( )O ip c SS V   . 
22 2 2
2
(1 ) (1 )[ (1 ) ] (1 )
(1 )[ (1 ) ]O
c z c c z
S
z
V J V JV J V V O JS V J V V V
            
§ ·¨ ¸© ¹    
( 2) 2 1
[( 2 ) 2 ]
N c c
c z c z c
N
O J OJ
     .     
 
2
[2 (1 ) ] (1 )
max ,0
(1 )[2 (1 ) ]O
c z z
c z
V V V J J VO V V J
       
­ ½® ¾¯ ¿ ,      (
1 2
3 4
ˆ max ,0
( )
c
c
K KO K K
 
­ ½® ¾¯ ¿ ,         (
4
zV\ V
{ ;  1 (1 )[ (1 ) (1 )]K J V V \ \ J      ; 
2 2
2 (1 )[ (1 ) ] ( 2 )[ (1 ) (1 )]z zK J V V J \V J V \         ; 
2
3 [(1 ) 2 ]z zK J V   ;  4 (1 )[2 (1 )( )]z zK \ J V V V V       
1IO ! . Further, if OO  we have OS S   and 2
ISS   .  
Since IS decreases as the reduction of O  and OS  increases as the increase ofO , Oˆ  (in which 2
I
O
SS  ) more 
than OO . It is also possible to check that ˆ 1O  . 
These results allow us to assess the feasibility (profitability) integration from the perspective of the combining 
entities. If the synergistic effects of integration satisfy 
2
[2 (1 ) ] (1 )
max ,0
(1 )[2 (1 ) ]
c z z
c z
V V V J J VO V V J
    t   
­ ½® ¾¯ ¿and
1 2
3 4
max ,0
( )
c
c
K KO K K
d 
­ ½® ¾¯ ¿ , 
where 
4
zV\ V
{ ;  1 (1 )[ (1 ) (1 )]K J V V \ \ J      ; 
2 2
2 (1 )[ (1 ) ] ( 2 )[ (1 ) (1 )]z zK J V V J \V J V \         ; 
2
3 [(1 ) 2 ]z zK J V   ;  4 (1 )[2 (1 )( )]z zK \ J V V V V      . 
integration is in order to the point of view of the combining entities. 
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 Conclusions: 
The analysis shows that the impact of free entry to the profit in the presence of Bertrand’s competition similar to 
effects produced by Cournot’s competition. As with competition Cournot’s integration creates a compromise 
between the cost savings generated by the synergistic effects and the effect of increasing market concentration  
(Morales and Gassie-Falzone, 2014). 
If integration reduces the number of firms in the market (Gatzia and Woods, 2014), it generates negative effects 
of increasing market concentration and reduced competition (Goyal and Yadav, 2014). These effects oppose benefits 
due to reduced costs. Therefore, likely to increase the integration of public welfare under Bertrand’s competition 
depends on the relative magnitude of these three factors, such as market concentration, the magnitude of the 
synergistic effects of reducing costs and number of products  (Williams, 2014). 
Consequently, the earlier conclusion: if the synergistic effects of reducing the costs associated with the 
integration , rather weak , integration is not beneficial to its members, if the synergistic effects of reducing the costs 
associated with the integration (Hoen, 2014), are moderate , integration is beneficial for its participants and leads to 
entry into the market new businesses (Koplyay et al, 2014), if synergistic effects are strong cost reduction , 
integration is beneficial for its members - does not depend on the type of competition, which involves businesses 
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